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Abstract. This work aims to solve a practical problem, i.e., how to
quantify the risk brought upon a system by different attackers. The an-
swer is useful for optimising resource allocation for system defence. Given
a set of safety requirements, we quantify the attacker capability in terms
of the set of safety requirements an attacker can compromise. Given a
system (in the presence of an attacker), model checking it against each
safety requirement one by one is expensive and wasteful (since the same
state space is explored many times). We thus propose model checking
multiple properties efficiently by means of coalgebraic model checking us-
ing enhanced coinduction techniques. We apply the proposed technique
to a real-world water treatment system and the results show that our
approach can effectively reduce the effort required for model checking.
1 Introduction
Having an understanding of the capabilities of attackers helps us decide how to
use our security resources in the most efficient way. Consider, for example, a
water treatment plant; it is unwise to put all efforts on physical security if an
attacker can hack into the controller through the internet and can then damage
the physical components by wrongful manipulation of the controller.
Attacker models often include a list of capabilities available to the attacker
that allow her to interact and interfere with the target system. Basin and Cre-
mers [1] classify attackers (each with an associated list of adversary actions)
based on whether each attacker can violate a given security property during a
protocol run using her available actions. Our view is that the capabilities of
powerful attackers are ultimately related to failed security requirements (e.g.,
an attacker that can reveal the state of the system violates the property that
the state of the system has to remain secret). In this sense, given a set of basic
security requirements, we could classify attackers based on how many of these
properties are violated.
In the case of CPSs, safety requirements describe which ranges are considered
safe for the different elements of the plant, usually in the form of invariants (e.g,
an invariant that defines the safe value readings for a pressure sensor). For a
given attacker and a given set of safety properties, we can model check each
safety property on the system under attack to quantify the attacker. However,
this approach is wasteful since we explore the state space many times (once per
property), and checking the product of all properties does not explicitly separate
those properties that are violated from those that are not. Moreover, for CPSs,
some of these safety properties are related by physical relationships (e.g., the
pressure inside a water tank is related to the water level). In these cases, we
would like to automatically infer the satisfaction/failure of related properties
from previous verifications with the goal to reduce the effort required to check
multiple properties.
The following research questions motivate our work: (RQ1) how can we
reduce the effort of verifying multiple properties for the quantification of attacker
capabilities? and (RQ2) how do we quantify the attackers using the verification
results? To answer RQ1, we need to show that the number of states or time which
is required to verify the properties one by one can be reduced when verifying
multiple properties, and to answer RQ2, we show the comparison between these
attackers and justify that the results are meaningful.
Our contributions are: • A formalisation of the problem of attacker quantifi-
cation from the perspective of model checking multiple properties. • A model
checking algorithm for safety properties which uses enhanced coinduction [10,11]
to speed up the verification of multiple properties; this speed-up is the result of
both exploiting algebraic properties of the state space, and by reusing knowledge
obtained in previous verifications.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the formalisms necessary to precisely present the
problem of attacker quantification.
A deterministic system with inputs in a set I and observations in a set O
is a tuple (X, θD , δD), where X is the set of states equipped with an observa-
tion function θD : X → O and a transition function δD : X × I → X . Usually,
deterministic systems have a distinguished initial state x0 ∈ X . A nondetermin-
istic system with inputs in I and observations in O is a tuple (X, θN , δN ) where,
again, X is a set of states equipped with an observation function θN : X → O,
but this time the transition function has the signature δN : X × I → Pω (X),
where Pω (X) is the set of finite subsets of X . Nondeterministic systems usually
have a finite set of initial states X0 ⊆ X instead of a single initial state.
F -coalgebras are a general framework which allows us to model both deter-
ministic and non-deterministic systems as systems of the same type [13].
Definition 1 (F -coalgebras). An F -coalgebra X is a tuple (X, θ, δ) where X
is the set of states, equipped with an observation function θ : X → P(O) and a
transition function δ : X → XI.
For a deterministic system (X, θD , δD), its corresponding F -coalgebra is (X, θ, δ),
where θ(x) , { θD(x) } and δ , δD . For a nondeterministic system (X, θN , δN ),
its corresponding F -coalgebra is (Pω (X), θ, δ), where θ(Y ) , { θD(x) | x ∈ Y }
and δ(Y ) , ∪{ δN (x) | x ∈ Y }, for Y ⊆ X .
The transition function δ of F -coalgebras can be iterated to yield the function
δ∗ : X → XI
∗
, which is inductively defined, for x ∈ X , i ∈ I and w ∈ I∗, by
δ∗(x)(ε) , x, and δ∗(x)(i : w) , δ∗(δ(x)(i))(w), (1)
where ε is the empty sequence, and : prepends i to the sequence w.
Definition 2 (Observable Behaviours). Let P(O)I
∗
be the set of functions
that map a finite sequence of inputs w ∈ I∗ to a set of observations. Given an
F -coalgebra X = (X, θ, δ), the mapping J−K
X
: X → P(O)I
∗
maps x ∈ X to its
observable behaviour JxK
X
∈ P(O)
I∗
, defined, for i ∈ I and w ∈ I∗, by
JxK
X
(ε) , θ(x), and JxK
X
(i : w) , Jδ(x)(i)K
X
(w). (2)
We usually refer to J−K
X
simply as J−K when the F -coalgebra X is clear from
the context.
We quantify the capabilities of the attacker by determining which security prop-
erties can be violated by using the attacks available to him/her. We model
attacks as functions that change the behaviours of an F -coalgebra.
Definition 3 (Attacks and Attackers). Any function α : P(O)
I∗
→ P(O)
I∗
is, by definition, an attack. An F -coalgebra X = (X, θ, δ) affected by α has the
observable behaviour JxK of each element x ∈ X replaced by the behaviour α(JxK).
An attacker A is a set of attacks.
The set P(O)
I∗
has a final F -coalgebra structure [13], which enables the
coinductive definition of attacks.
Definition 4 (Final F -coalgebra). The F -coalgebra Ω , (P(O)I
∗
, θΩ, δΩ)
is the final F -coalgebra; defined for σ ∈ P(O)
I∗
, i ∈ I, and w ∈ I∗ by
θΩ(σ) , σ(ε), and δΩ(σ)(i) , λw ∈ I
∗. σ(i : w). (3)
The commutative diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the effect of an attack α
on the elements of an F -coalgebra X = (X, θ, δ). Because Ω is the final F -
coalgebra, the pairing (θΩ, δΩ) is an isomorphism [13], and we can coinduc-
tively define the attack α through the functions θα : P(O)
I∗
→ P(O) and
δα : P(O)
I∗
→
(
P(O)
I∗
)I
, since α = (θΩ, δΩ)
−1 ◦ (θα, δα), where ◦ is function
composition. We take a coinductive approach for the definition of attacks because
coinductive definitions make explicit the effects of an attack over observations
and transitions.
Example 1 (Attacking a Dial of a Combination Lock). Let 10 = { 0, .., 9 }, I =
{ • } and O = 10. We model a dial system using the F -coalgebra D = (10, θ, δ),
defined for x ∈ 10 by:
θ(x) , { x } , and δ(x, •) , x+ 1 (mod 10)
X P(O)I
∗
P(O)I
∗
P(O)×XI P(O)×
(
P(O)I
∗
)
I
P(O)×
(
P(O)I
∗
)
I
(θ, δ) (θΩ , δΩ)
α
(θΩ , δΩ)
−1(θα, δα)
J−K
idP(O) × J−K
idI
Fig. 1. Transformation caused by an attack α : P(O)I
∗
→ P(O)I
∗
on the behaviours
of an F -coalgebra (X, θ, δ). (A function idP(O)×f
idI is defined, for (Z, g) ∈ P(O)×XI ,
by
(
idP(O) × f
idI
)
(Z, g) , (Z, f ◦ g)), where ◦ is function composition.
We coinductively define an attack α, for σ ∈ P(O)I
∗
and i ∈ I, by θα(σ) , { 0 }
and δα(σ)(i) , α(δΩ(σ)(i)). It is not difficult to show, for σ ∈ P(O)
I∗
and
w ∈ I∗, that α(σ)(w) = { 0 }. The attack α models a change in the observation
function θ such that θ(x) evaluates to { 0 } for all x ∈ 10.
We also coinductively define an attack β by θβ(σ) , θΩ(σ) and δβ(σ)(i) ,
β(J0K). The attack β is slightly different from the attack α, since it models a
change in the transition function δ such that δ(x) evaluates to 0 for all x ∈ 10.
Both attacks have the same effect on the behaviour J0K, i.e., α(J0K) = β(J0K);
thus, we see that different attacks can have the same effect over the behaviour of
some states. Finally, from the set of attacks {α, β } we can obtain four attackers,
which correspond to the subsets of {α, β }.
We now present a logic to describe properties of F -coalgebras. Coalgebraic logics
are µ-calculus-like logics that naturally define an F -coalgebra on formulae. This
provides intuitive semantics for formulae (a F -coalgebra) and formulae satisfac-
tion (in terms of relationships between F -coalgebras).
Definition 5 (Safety Formulae). Let V be a set of variables. Let P ⊆ I,
Q ⊆ O, and v ∈ V ; the set L of safety formulae is given by the BNF syntax
ψ ::= v | [P ]ψ | ↓(Q) | ψ ∧ ψ | νv.ψ(v). (4)
Formulae of the form [P ]ψ are transition formulae, formulae of the form ↓(Q) are
observation formulae, and formulae of the form ψ(v) are guarded modal formulae.
We denote the set of closed and guarded safety formulae (i.e., formulae without
free occurrences of fixed point variables v, unless guarded) by Lcg. We also use
the syntactic sugar tt to denote ↓(O), and ¬ ↓(Q) to denote ↓(O −Q).
The semantics of a safety formula describes which observations are valid for
the current state, and which obligations must hold for successor states so that
the formula is valid at the current state. We define these semantics using an
F -coalgebra.
Definition 6 (Semantics). We define the F -coalgebra ζ by ζ , (Lcg, θζ , δζ),
where θζ : L
c
g → P(O) and δζ : L
c
g →
(
Lcg
)I
are defined in Table 1.
Since the only F -coalgebra we define over Lcg is ζ, we henceforth write θ(ψ)
and δ(ψ) instead of θζ(ψ) and δζ(ψ) to ease readability.
θζ([P ]ψ) , O δζ([P ]ψ, i) ,
{
ψ, if i ∈ P
tt, otherwise.
θζ(↓(Q)) , Q δζ(↓(Q) , i) , tt
θζ(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) , θζ(ψ1) ∩ θζ(ψ2) δζ(ψ1 ∧ ψ2)(i) , δζ(ψ1)(i) ∧ δζ(ψ2)(i)
θζ(νv.ψ(v)) , θζ(ψ [νv.ψ(v)/v]) δζ(νv.ψ(v))(i) , δζ(ψ [νv.ψ(v)/v])(i)
Table 1. Definitions of θζ and δζ . The expression ψ [νv.ψ(v)/v] denotes the syntactic
substitution of every free occurrence of v in ψ(v) by νv.ψ(v).
The size of ψ is the number of formulae that are reachable from it, i.e.,
|v| = 1, | [P ]ψ| = 1 + |ψ|, | ↓(Q) |= 1,
|ψ1 ∧ ψ2| = max(|ψ1|, |ψ2|), |νv.ψ(v)| = |ψ [νv.ψ(v)/v])|.
To capture the notion of safety formulae satisfaction, we use simulation re-
lations between F -coalgebras.
Definition 7 (Simulation of F -coalgebras). Let X = (X, θX, δX) and Y =
(Z, θY, δY) be F -coalgebras. Given R ⊆ X × Z, we say that R is a simulation
from X to Y if and only if θX(x) ⊆ θY(y) and (δX(x)(i), δY(y)(i)) ∈ R for all
(x, y) ∈ R and i ∈ I. The greatest simulation relation, ., is called similarity.
Definition 8 (Safety Formula Satisfaction). Given an F -coalgebra X =
(X, θ, δ), x ∈ X, and a safety formula ψ ∈ Lcg, we say that x satisfies ψ in
the context of X, written (X, x)  ψ, if and only if x . ψ; i.e., the pair (x, ψ)
belongs to the similarity relation from X to ζ.
In other words, (X, x)  ψ if and only if all the observations of x are in
the observations allowed by ψ, and all the successors of x satisfy the transition
formulae associated with ψ. More precisely, (X, x)  ψ, if and only
θ(x) ⊆ θ(ψ), and (X, δ(x)(i))  δ(ψ)(i), for all i ∈ I. (5)
Remark 1 (Formulae Implication). Consider two safety formulae ψ1 and ψ2 with
ψ1 . ψ2. Whenever (X, x)  ψ1, we can conclude (X, x)  ψ2 that since the com-
position of simulation relations is a simulation relation itself. Thus, the similarity
relation . in the F -coalgebra ζ corresponds to formulae implication.
Definition 9 (Formulae). Let P ⊆ I and ψ ∈ Lcg; the set L of formulae is
given by the BNF syntax
φ ::= ψ | ¬φ | v | [P ]φ | φ ∧ φ | νv.φ(v). (6)
We use syntactic sugar in the usual way: φ1∨φ2 denotes ¬(¬φ1∧¬φ2), φ1 ⇒ φ2
denotes ¬φ1 ∨ φ2, 〈P 〉φ denotes ¬([P ]¬φ), µv.φ(v) denotes ¬(νv.¬φ(¬v)), φ
denotes νv.φ ∧ [I](v), and ♦φ denotes ¬(¬φ). Similarly, the set Lcg of closed
and guarded formulae contains all formulae that have no occurrences of free
variables.
The notion of satisfaction for non-safety formulae extends that of safety for-
mulae, and it is inductively defined as follows:
(X, x)  ¬φ ⇔ ¬((X, x)  φ),
(X, x)  [P ]φ ⇔ (∀i ∈ P. (X, δ(x)(i))  φ),
(X, x)  φ1 ∧ φ2 ⇔ (X, x)  φ1 ∧ (X, x)  φ2
(X, x)  νv.φ(v) ⇔ (X, x)  φ [νv.φ(v)/v] .
Definition 10 (Counterexample). Let X = (X, θ, δ) be an F -coalgebra, x ∈
X, and φ ∈ Lcg; say that a pair (xcex , φcex) is a counterexample for (X, x)  φ
if and only if (X, xcex) 6 φcex and that (X, xcex) 6 φcex implies (X, x) 6 φ.
As our counterexamples do not involve state traces, they could be considered
“not very informative” for the purposes of debugging or security patching; how-
ever, the existence of a counterexample suffices for the purposes of attacker
quantification.
Following Equation 5, for a given a safety formula ψ, there are two ordinary
reasons for the existence of a counterexample for (X, x)  ψ: either (x, ψ) is a
counterexample, or there is a counterexample (δ(x)(i), δ(ψ)(i)) for some i ∈ I.
Example 2. Consider the predicate (· = z) , { y | y ∈ Y and y = z } for some set
Y , and similarly for the predicate (· 6= z). Recall the dial system from Example 1,
and consider the non-safety property ♦ ↓ (· = n) at state 0, which informally
means “the dial eventually displays the value n (for some n ∈ 10).” The high-
level verification procedure is as follows: since ♦ ↓(· = n) = ¬ ( ↓(· 6= n)), and
since (n,↓(· 6= n)) is a counterexample for (D, 0)   ↓ (· 6= n), we conclude
that (D, 0)  ♦ ↓(· = n).
Consider now an attack α, coinductively defined for σ ∈ P(O)
I∗
, by θα(σ) ,
θΩ(σ), and δα(σ)(•) , α(δ∗Ω(σ)(•, •)). The attack α changes the behaviour of the
dial system D, yielding the F -coalgebra (10, θ|α, δ|α), defined by θ|α(n) , θ(n),
and δ|α(n)(•) , δ∗(n)(•, •). Since the attack α forces δ(x)(•) to be x+2 (mod 10)
instead of x + 1 (mod 10), state 0 now fails to satisfy ♦ ↓ (· = 1), because the
observation of all states that are reachable from 0 are even numbers.
3 Attacker Quantification
We present the problem of attacker quantification in terms of the final F -
coalgebra without losing generality thanks to the following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For an F -coalgebra X = (X, θ, δ), x ∈ X, and for φ ∈ Lcg,
(X, x)  φ if and only if (Ω, JxK)  φ. (7)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our formulation of the attacker quantification problem is the following: given
an F -coalgebra X = (X, θ, δ), a distinguished state x0 ∈ X , a set of closed and
guarded formulae F = {φ1, . . . , φn } such that (X, x0)  φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn, we are
given a set of attackers A = {A1, . . . , Ak }, where each attacker A ∈ A is a set
of attacks (i.e., A is a subset of P(O)I
∗
→ P(O)I
∗
). We define capabilities of
an attacker A at x0 in the context of X as the subset of formulae in F that do
not hold in at least one of the compromised behaviours of x0; more precisely
capabilities(A,X, x0) ,
⋃
α∈A
{φ | φ ∈ F and (Ω,α(Jx0K)) 6 φ } . (8)
We say that an attacker A1 is less capable than an attacker A2 at x0 in the
context of X, written A1 ≤(X,x0) A2, if and only if capabilities(A1,X, x0) ⊆
capabilities(A2,X, x0). The main objective of this work is to find an efficient
algorithm that calculates the relation ≤(X,x0) for the attackers in A.
We remark that the number of attacks available to an attacker and the ef-
fective capabilities of that attacker are not necessarily proportional: an attacker
A1 who has several attacks might not be as capable as an attacker A2 that has
only one attack, because the number of properties violated by A1 may be smaller
than the number of properties violated by A2. For example, an attacker has n
attacks that allow her to spy in total log n of a secret of size n can be considered
weaker than an attacker that has only one attack which reveals the whole secret.
We use the following running example to illustrate the concepts presented
the remainder of this section.
Example 3 (A Combination Lock).
By putting four dials from Example 1 together, we form a combination
lock. Let I = 4 = { 0, 1, 2, 3} and O = 104; we define the F -coalgebra C ,
(104, Θ,∆), where an input i ∈ 4 describes which dial should increase its counter.
The functions Θ and ∆ are defined, for −→x ∈ 104 and i, j ∈ 4, by
Θ(−→x ) , {−→x } , and ∆(−→x )(i)(j) ,
{
−→
x (j), if i 6= j;
δ(−→x (i), •), otherwise.
(9)
Now, given a value−→n ∈ 104, consider the property ♦ ↓
(
· = −→n
)
, which informally
means “there is a sequence of inputs that will cause the combination lock to
output −→n .”
For a naive model checking algorithm, to prove that the state 0000 satisfies
all properties ♦ ↓
(
· = −→n
)
for −→n with 0000 ≤ −→n ≤ 9999, it would be necessary
to infer 10000 counterexamples (one for each corresponding safety property).
However, in the following, we present an algorithm that can infer these coun-
terexamples in a smarter way by means of enhanced coinduction [10,11].
Our model checking algorithm Verify is presented in Algorithm 27. Verify uses
enhanced coinduction: a technique that builds relations whose closures given a
set of algebraic operators are (bi)simulations. These relations help to reduce
state exploration and to infer counterexamples.
1 R← R0;
2 F ← F0;
3 todo← [(x0, ψ0)];
4 while todo 6= [] do
5 (x, ψ)← todo.pop();
6 if ctu({ (x,ψ) }) ∩ F 6= ∅ then
7 return (false,R0, F );
8 end
9 if (x, ψ) 6∈ ctu(R) then
10 if θ(x) 6⊆ θ(ψ) then
11 F.insert(x, ψ);
12 return (false,R0, F );
13 else
14 R.insert(x, ψ);
15 for i ∈ I do
16 if ctu({ (δ(x, i), δ(ψ, i)) }) ∩ F 6= ∅ then
17 todo.prepend((cex : i), δ(x)(i), δ(ψ)(i));
18 break;
19 end
20 if (δ(x)(i), δ(ψ)(i)) 6∈ ctu(R) then
21 todo.append(δ(x)(i), δ(ψ)(i));
22 end
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 return (true,R,F0);
Algorithm 1: The Verify algorithm.
Verify receives as input a tuple (X, x0, ψ0, R0, F0) of an F -coalgebra X =
(X, θ, δ), a state x0, a safety formula ψ0, a relation R0 where x R0 ψ ⇒ x  ψ;
and a relation F0 where x F0 ψ ⇒ x 6 ψ. After execution, Verify returns
a tuple (res,R, F ) where res equals true if (X, x0)  ψ0, otherwise res equals
false; a relation R, where, if (x, ψ) ∈ R, then x  ψ; and a relation F where, if
(x, ψ) ∈ F , then x 6 ψ.
Verify relies on the same principles as the HKC algorithm [2] (a version of
Hopcroft and Karp’s algorithm [7] that uses enhanced coinduction to decide lan-
guage equivalence of finite automata). Our use of enhanced coinduction is marked
by the appearance of the precongruence closure function ctu : P
(
X × Lcg
)
→
P
(
X × Lcg
)
in Lines 6, 9, 16, and 20.
Using precongruence closures, we can build simulation up-to-precongruences
that speed up the verification process by helping in the inference of satisfaction/-
failure of the formulae we are checking. To define these closures, it is desirable to
have a set of algebraic operators. In a nutshell, algebraic operators are functions
that preserve the satisfaction relation between states and safety formulae.
Definition 11 (Algebraic Operator). Let X = (X, θ, δ) be an F -coalgebra;
we say that a function β : X × Lcg → X × L
c
g is an algebraic operator (in the
context of X) if and only if β is monotone with respect to .
Besides the obvious identity operator, the following operators exist for any F -
coalgebra. Let X = (X, θ, δ) be an F -coalgebra. For all i ∈ I, we the operator
i
−→ : X × Lcg → X × L
c
g, for x ∈ X and ψ ∈ L
c
g, is defined by
i
−→ (x, ψ) , (δ(x)(i), δ(ψ)(i)∧ ↓(θ(δ(x)(i)))). (10)
This construction “forces” the behaviour of x into the formula ψ. If δ(ψ)(i)∧ ↓
(θ(δ(x)(i))) is ff, then (δ(x)(i), δ(ψ)(i)) must be a counterexample for (x, ψ),
since θ(δ(x)(i)) cannot be a subset of θ(δ(ψ)(i)). This condition bears a remark-
able similarity to the acceptance conditions used in the explicit state model
checking, which uses product automata with a special acceptance condition [4].
We can finally introduce the precongruence closure operator ctu, which en-
hances contextual closures with transitivity-and-union (of simulation relations).
Definition 12 (Precongruence Closure). Let (X, θ, δ) be an F -coalgebra, let
≤ ⊆ X ×X be a simulation relation in X and let  ⊆ Lcg ×L
c
g be a simulation
in Lcg. Given a relation R ⊆ X × L
c
g, we inductively define the precongruence
closure ctu(R) of R using the following inference rules:
id:
x R φ
x ctu(R) φ
, cβ :
x R φ, β(x, φ) = (x′, φ′)
x′ ctu(R) φ′
,
tu≤:
x ≤ y, y ctu(R) φ
x ctu(R) φ
, tu⇒:
x ctu(R) φ, φ  φ′
x ctu(R) φ′
,
(Since we are only interested in element-formula pairs for model checking, we
omit including reflexive and symmetry rules in the precongruence closure.)
If ctu(R) is a simulation between X and Lcg, then we say that R is a simu-
lation up-to-precongruence.
Proposition 2 (Satisfaction Through Enhancement). Let X = (X, θ, δ) be
an F -coalgebra, x ∈ X be a state, and φ ∈ Lcg be a safety formula; if (X, x)  φ,
then (X, x′)  φ′ for all (x′, φ′) ∈ ctu ({ (x, φ) }).
Proof. We prove that (X, x′)  φ′ for the different cases of (x′, φ′):
– id: if (x′, φ′) = (x, φ), then (X, x′)  φ′ trivially holds since (X, x)  φ
– cβ : if (x
′, φ′) = β(x, φ), then (X, x′)  φ′ holds because β is monotone with
respect to .
– tu: if x′ S x and φ⇒ φ′, then (X, x′)  φ′ since the composition of simulation
relations is a simulation relation, and all simulation relations from X to ζ
are subsets of .
– ctu: if x′ S β(x) and γ(φ) ⇒ φ′, then (X, x′)  φ′ follows from a similar
argument. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1 (Counterexample Through Enhancement). If there exists a
pair (x′, φ′) in ctu ({ (x, φ) }) such that (X, x′) 6 φ′, then (X, x) 6 φ. Hence,
(x′, φ′) is a counterexample for (X, x)  φ.
Proof. By a contrapositive argument of Proposition 2. ⊓⊔
We use Corollary 1 in Line 6 of the Verify algorithm to infer violation of prop-
erties, considering that F , for each pair (x, φ) in F , we have (X, x) 6 φ.
The Verify algorithm heavily relies on Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 for its
correctness: at its core, Verify builds a relation R, and treats it as if it was
a simulation up-to precongruence, until we either find a counterexample or we
finish, and we can conclude that all elements in R are valid state-formula pairs.
Verify explores a space of size |x0||ψ0|, where |x0| is the number of states that
are reachable from x0. For each pair (x, ψ) that has not been visited, the algo-
rithm has to check whether θ(x) ⊆ θ(ψ), which is lineal in the size of O. Without
any optimisation, Verify would have a worst time complexity of O(|O||X ||ψ0|).
Moreover, if we have n formulae to check, the worst case complexity of the at-
tacker quantification problem is O(n|O||X ||ψmax|) where |ψmax| is the biggest
formula. Our intention is to reduce the complexity in two fronts: one, to change
the worst case complexity to O(a|O||X ||ψmax| + b|R| + c|F |) by allowing the
inference of, ideally with O(a) < O(n), and second, reduce the complexity of
a single execution of Verify from O(|O||X ||ψ0|) to O(k|O||X | + j|R|), ideally
with O(k) < O(|ψ0|). We remark that the use of algebraic operators does not
guarantee a reduction in the overall complexity of the algorithm, and may even
cause unnecessary overhead; however, our experiments show that we can achieve
reductions in the size of the state space by using algebraic operators.
We now recall the research questions that motivate this work: (RQ1) how
can we reduce the effort of verifying multiple properties for the quantification
of attacker capabilities? and (RQ2) how do we quantify the attackers using the
verification results?
During the remainder of this section, we answer RQ1 by performing exper-
iments in the combination lock and a BEEM (Benchmarks for Explicit Model
Checkers) problem [9]. More precisely, we use different sets of algebraic opera-
tors to reduce the number of states that the Verify algorithm has to explore or
reduce the number of properties hat have to be verified. We show an answer for
RQ2 in Section 4.
Let us consider two algebraic operators for the combination lock C: an oper-
ator shift that shifts the components of the dial to the right, and an operator
add that adds 1 to the rightmost component of the dial. Formally, we define
shift : 104 × Lcg → 10
4 × Lcg, for (x0, x1, x2, x3) ∈ 10
4 and φ1, φ2 ∈ L
c
g, in a
component wise manner (i.e., shift = (shift1, shift2)) by
shift1(x0, x1, x2, x3) , (x3, x0, x1, x2);
shift2(↓(Q)) ,↓(shift1(Q)) , shift2(φ1 ∧ φ2) , shift2(φ1) ∧ shift2(φ2)
shift2([P ]φ) , [P ] (shift2(φ)) , shift2(νv.ψ) , shift2(ψ [νv.ψ/v]),
where shift1(Q) , { shift1(
−→
q ) | −→q ∈ Q }. Similarly, we define add : 104 ×
Lcg → 10
4 × Lcg, for (x0, x1, x2, x3) ∈ 10
4 and φ1, φ2 ∈ L
c
g, by
add1(x0, x1, x2, x3) , (x0, x1, x2, x3 + 1 (mod 10));
add2(↓(Q)) ,↓(add1(Q)) , add2(φ1 ∧ φ2) , add2(φ1) ∧ add2(φ2)
add2([P ]φ) , [P ] (add2(φ)) , add2(νv.ψ) , add2(ψ [νv.ψ/v]),
where add1(Q) , { add1(
−→
q ) | −→q ∈ Q }. We also define shift2, shift3, and add2
to add9 by composing the operators with themselves.
To provide an intuition of how formulae can be inferred from previous verifi-
cation experiences, let us describe the first steps of a verification procedure that
uses the operators shift and add. We start with R = { } and F = { }, then, for
(0000, ↓ (· 6= 0000)), Verify concludes that (0000, ↓ (· 6= 0000)) is a coun-
terexample, and it returns (false, { } , { (0000, ↓(· 6= 0000)) }). We can hence-
forth infer that any pair (x, φ) such that (0000, ↓ (· 6= 0000)) ∈ ctu({ (x, φ) })
is a counterexample for the formula that we are currently checking. Note that,
since we only considered the shift and add operators, this condition holds only
for (0009, ↓ (· 6= 0009)); nevertheless, we could extend this condition to all
pairs of the form (000x, ↓(· 6= 000x)) if we considered more addi operators.
We continue verifying with the knowledge we have so far: with R = { } and
F = { (0000, ↓(· 6= 0000)) }, for (0000, ↓(· 6= 0001)), Verify returns
(false, { } , { (0000, ↓(· 6= 0000)), (0000, ↓(· 6= 0001)) })
Henceforth, for any (x, φ) with (0000, ↓ (· 6= 0001)) ∈ ctu({ (x, φ) }), we can
infer that (x, φ) is a counterexample for the formula we are currently checking.
For example, the verification of  ↓ (· 6= 0010) becomes “trivial,” since Verify
infers its failure at the initial state.
We observe that use of algebraic operators during verification can make some
properties trivial to verify, since their validity can be inferred at the initial state.
Table 2 shows the number of properties that become trivial given different com-
binations of operators. We see that the more operators we consider, the more
likely it is for Verify to infer properties.
In the bounded concurrent adding puzzle (from [9]), there are two processes
P and Q running in parallel, and they write over shared accumulator c, with P
= loop {x=c; x=x+c; c=x;} and Q = loop {y=c; y=y+c; c=y;}. The initial
value of c is 1, and the claim is that c can eventually take any given natural
value. With I = { 1, 2 }, and O = N, and X = {Q,R, S } × N, we model the
addition puzzle problem X = (X ×X ×N, Θ,∆) with an interleaving product of
Operators Inferred Operators Inferred
{ shift } 3675 { shift, shift2, shift3 } 7470
{ add } 5000 { shift, shift2, shift3, add } 7470
{ shift, add } 5925 { shift, shift2, shift3, add, add2 } 7550
{shift, shift2 } 4995 { shift, shift2, shift3, add, add2, ..., add9 } 9046
Table 2. Inferred properties given a set of algebraic operators (out of 10000) in the
combination lock example.
(N,MAX) None swap None swap
(17, 20) 1616 845 0.76 s 0.40 s
(500, 200) 14298 7937 6.63 s 3.82 s
(637, 300) 485942 247602 252.01 s 145.84 s
(749, 400) 845020 425093 446.25 s 267.58 s
Table 3. States explored and average time for the concurrent addition puzzle.
two coalgebras defined by
θ(x, n) , n,
δ(x, n)(c) ,


(R, c) if x = Q and c < MAX
(S, n+ c), if x = R
(Q,n), if x = S
(x, n), otherwise.
Θ((x1, n1), (x2, n2), c) , { c } ,
∆((x1, n1), (x2, n2), c)(i) ,


∆(δ(x1, n1)(c), (x2, n2), c), if i = 1 and x1 6= S;
∆(δ(x1, n1)(c), (x2, n2), n1), if i = 1 and x1 = S;
∆((x1, n1), δ(x2, n2)(c), c), if i = 2 and x2 6= S;
∆((x1, n1), δ(x2, n2)(c), n2), if i = 2 and x2 = S;
For c with 1 ≤ c ≤ MAX , we prove that the initial state, ((Q, 0), (Q, 0), 1),
satisfies ♦ ↓(· = c), which is equivalent to solving the puzzle for c.
We now define the swap operator that swaps both processes by
swap(((x1, n1), (x2, n2), c), φ) , ((x2, n2), (x1, n1), c), φ). (11)
Table 3 shows the impact of using swap during verification. We observe that the
swap operator consistently reduces state exploration by almost half.
4 A Case Study
To illustrate the problem of attacker quantification through model checking, we
provide a small case study based on the water treatment testbed SWaT [8].
SWaT is an operational test bed, built for experimental research in the design
and security of industrial control systems ICS in the Singapore University of
Technology and Design. SWaT is miniature version of the actual water treatment
plants in Singapore, capable of producing 5 gallons/minute of treated water.
The SWaT testbed consists of six physical processes controlled by Programming
Logic Controllers (PLCs), a human-machine interface, a SCADA system, and
a historian. Each physical process has its own sensors and actuators, including
pressure meters, flow meters and valves among others.
For this example, we consider a part of process 1 of the water treatment
cycle, which is in charge of water collection. We show how we can translate a
relationship between physical properties of the system into something that can
be used by Verify to check for properties.
Consider the composition of a controller C, a water tank t101, a water level
sensor lit101, a water pressure sensor hg101, and an input valve mv101. In
this process, the water level and water pressure of the system are related by
hydrostatic pressure: a physical invariant modelled by the equation hg101 ≈
g ∗ lit101, where g is the acceleration caused by gravity.
We model the valve mv101 as two-state systems whose state represents
whether the valve is open or closed. The input to the valve is cv ∈ { open, close},
and sets its next state. There are different cases: if lit101 < 500, then cv = open;
if lit101 > 800, then cv = close, and cv = mv101 otherwise.
We model the water tank as a system whose state is defined by its current
water level, and is bounded by a capacity of 1200. The input to the tank is
its current inflow in, and its state transitions are defined by the inflow-outflow
equation t′ = t+ in− out with out = 0.44 (enforcing 0 ≤ t′ ≤ 1200), where t is
the current water level of the tank. The input in in turn respectively depends
on the state of the valve mv101 as follows: if mv101 = open, then in = 0.46;
otherwise, in = 0.
We can model this process as a F -coalgebra with I = { • } and O = L×P×B,
where L is the set of valid water level readings and P is the set of valid water
pressure readings. We define the F -coalgebra P = (L × L × P, θ, δ); a state is a
tuple (t, lit101, hg101) where t is the real water level of the tank and a is the
state of the alarm in the controller. The functions θ and δ are defined by
θ(t, lit101, hg101), (t, g ∗ t, hg101 ≈ g ∗ lit101), (12)
δ(t, lit101, hg101), (t′, t, g ∗ t) (13)
We model the hydrostatic pressure enforced by physics with the formula
Hydro , (↓((t, p, a) ≈ (t, g ∗ t, a))),
while the relationship hg101 ≈ g ∗ lit101 is checked as part of the observation of
the state. Whenever this relationship between sensor readings does not hold, we
raise an alarm. Now, consider the following safety requirements:
1. The real water level is always within safe levels,
2. The real water pressure is always within safe levels,
3. Consistent readings between the water level sensor and the pressure sensor,
Formula (θ, δ) (θ, δα) (θ, δβ) (θ, δγ)
Lvl 15757, T rue 683, False 16199, T rue 683, False
Hg 1, T rue 683, False 1, T rue 683, False
Con 15757,True 2, False 2, False 1139, T rue
Table 4. This table shows for a given formula and an attacker model how many states
were explored by the verification algorithm and whether the property holds or not for
state (500, g ∗ 500, T rue).
These three properties can be respectively modelled by the following formulae,
Lvl , (↓((t, , ) ≥ 200)∧ ↓((t, , ) ≤ 1000)), (14)
Hg , (↓(( , p, ) ≥ 1000)∧ ↓(( , p, ) ≤ 9000)), (15)
Con , (↓(( , , a) = True)). (16)
Since these safety formulae have coalgebraic semantics, we can compute the
largest similarity relation in the set {Hydro, Lvl,Hg, Con} prior to verification,
which yields the simulation relation { (Hydro ∧ Lvl, P ) | P ∈ {Lvl,Hg } }; from
this relation, we can infer Hg from Hydro∧Lvl should Lvl be satisfied (Hydro
is itself enforced by the laws of physics, so there is no need to check it). Thus,
we can sort our proof obligations as [Lvl,Hg, Con], so that, if Lvl holds, then
we can infer Hg from the precongruence closure using the rule tu⇒.
Consider the following attacks over sensor readings, which are modelled after
realistic attacks for CPSs [3]; similar attacks have been carried out in the real
testbed during the SWaT Security Showdown [5]:
1. Set lit101 to its maximum value (surge attack),
2. Add a bias b to the current value of lit101 (bias attack),
3. Add a bias b to the current value of lit101, and produce a consistent reading
from hg101 (stealthy attack).
We model these attacks respectively with the following functions:
SurgeUp(t, lit101, hg101), (t, 1200, hg101) (17)
Biasb(t, lit101, hg101), (t, lit101 + b, hg101) (18)
Stealthyb(t, lit101, hg101), (t, lit101 + b, hg101 + g ∗ b) (19)
We use these functions to define new F -coalgebras that capture the effect of
these attacks. Let δα , δ ◦SurgeUp, δβ , δ ◦Bias200 and δγ , δ ◦Stealthy500 ;
we preserve the observation function θ as it is. We will consider three attackers:
{α }, { β }, and { γ }.
Table 4 illustrates how many states need exploration when verifying the three
properties. We make measurements for the original system and for the system
under attacks α, β and γ. For this exercise, our initial state is (500, g∗500, T rue),
and we reuse the knowledge of previous verifications (e.g., we use whatever we
learn from the verification of Lvl to verify Hg and Con). According to the
definition of attacker capabilities from Section 3, obtain the following results:
capabilities({α} ,P, (500, g ∗ 500, T rue)) = {Lvl,Hg, Con}
capabilities({ β } ,P, (500, g ∗ 500, T rue)) = {Con }
capabilities({ γ } ,P, (500, g ∗ 500, T rue)) = {Lvl,Hg }
These results yield the following attacker hierarchy: { β } ≤ {α } and { γ } ≤
{α }. Attackers { β } and { γ } are unrelated.
We might want to apply filters to obtain further interesting classifications.
For example, if we are looking for attackers that do not try to avoid detectability,
then we focus on attackers that have have Con as part of their their capabilities
(in this case, {α } and { β }). This result fits the intuition that attacker { γ } puts
effort into creating a consistent reading for both sensors, unlike attackers {α }
and { β }. For another example, if we are concerned about attackers that can
impact the physical aspect of the system in a noticeable way (e.g., by causing
the water tank to have an unsafe water level), then we look for attackers with
Lvl in their set of capabilities (in this case, {α } and { γ }).
5 Related Work
Basin and Cremers [1] define a unified framework for the definition of attackers
and protocols; the authors associate attackers with a set of attacker actions, and
then infer the set of attacks available to the attacker from these actions. In their
framework, attacks correspond to a sequence of actions that an attacker takes
during a protocol execution. We adopt a different approach, and we consider
attackers to be sets of functions that change the behaviour of the system (i.e,
attacks); a systematic construction of attacks is outside of the scope of this work.
For CPSs, Rothstein et al. [12] compare attackers of CPSs using a measure
of control over physical properties. In [12], each attacker is given set of actuators
and sensors under her control, and by quantifying her interference over a physical
variable, they provide a measure of the power of the attacker (for example,
attackers that can both empty and overflow a water tank are considered strictly
more powerful than attackers that can only empty the tank).
We can also consider risk assessment to be related to the problem of quanti-
fying the capabilities of attackers. In particular, we would like to highlight the
work of Cardenas et al. [3] in risk assessment for CPSs, where they claim that
the most well known risk metric is probably the average loss, which depends on
the probability of occurrence of an event and proportional to the estimated loss
caused by the event. Intuitively, this claim is not exclusive to CPSs, and there
are several ways to mathematically define average loss.
With respect to the verification of multiple properties, we would like to men-
tion the work by Goldberg et al. [6], where they consider the problem of efficiently
checking a set of safety properties P1 to Pk. Their JA-verification (short for Just-
Assume) consists of individually checking each property, while assuming that all
other properties are valid. However, their approach does not guarantee the iden-
tification of all failed properties, which is a vital requirement for our attacker
capability quantification. We thus needed to adopt an alternative approach.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to use enhanced coin-
duction for the model checking of multiple properties. Bonchi and Pous [2] use
bisimulation up to congruence to prove language equivalence of non-deterministic
finite automata by optimising the classical algorithm by Hopcroft and Karp, and
Rot provides in [11] a comprehensive study of enhanced coinduction.
6 Conclusion
We illustrated by means of a case study how it is possible to quantify attackers
via coalgebraic model checking multiple properties. The case study is based on
an existing water treatment testbed, and it shows how attackers can be classified
in terms of the properties that they violate.
We show that using enhanced coinduction for the model checking of multiple
properties can reduce both the number of properties to be verified and the state
space of individual verifications at the linear cost of computing the precongruence
closure over the relations used to store knowledge. While our experiments show
that it is possible to greatly reduce the number of properties to be verified (e.g.,
from 10000 to only 954) given an adequate choice of algebraic operators, we
remark that using enhanced coinduction does not guarantee a reduction in the
effort required to verify multiple properties, since computing the precongruence
closure requires an effort linear in the size of the relation that we use to store
knowledge. From our experiments, we see a greater reduction in state exploration
if the algebraic operators inform the model checking algorithm of any algebraic
structure in the state space; for example, if there are symmetries in the state
space.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Since bisimulations correspond to behavioural equivalence relations in de-
terministic systems, and since coalgebraic logics respect bisimulations, it suffices
to show that the graph of J−K is a bisimulation relation from X to Γ (Jx0K) to
prove the proposition.
We define the graph of J−K by G(J−K) , { (x, JxK) | x ∈ X }. To show that
J−K is a bisimulation, we must show, for all (x, JxK) ∈ G(J−K):
1. that (x0, Jx0K) ∈ G(J−K) (this holds by definition of J−K);
2. that x and JxK have the same observations; i.e., that θ(x)θΓ (JxK); and
3. that the next states of x are in relation with the next states of JxK; i.e., that
for all i ∈ I, (xi, δΓ (JxK, i)) ∈ G(J−K).
For 2.: By the definitions of J−K and of θΓ , we see that
θΓ (JxK) = JxK(ε) = θ(x),
so this condition is satisfied.
For 3.: by the definitions of J−K and of δΓ , we have, for i ∈ I, that
δΓ (JxK, i)(w) = JxK(i : w) = Jx
iK(w)
Since (xi, JxiK) ∈ G(J−K) for all i ∈ I, we conclude that (xi, δΓ (JxK, i)) ∈ G(J−K),
so this condition is also satisfied.
As conditions 1., 2., and 3. are satisfied, we infer that G(J−K) is a bisimula-
tion between X and Γ (Jx0K). Since coalgebraic logics respect bisimulations, we
conclude, for every formula φ, that (X, x0)  φ if and only if (Γ (Jx0K), Jx0K)  φ.
⊓⊔
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